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Some harms are such that they cannot be prevented by a single individual because she
lacks the requisite control. Because of this, no individual has the obligation to do so. It
may be, however, that the harm can be prevented when several individuals combine
their efforts. I argue that in many such situations each individual has a duty to join
forces: to approach others, convince them to contribute, and subsequently make a co-
ordinated effort to prevent the harm. A distinctive feature of this proposal is that, in
the ﬁrst instance, it focuses on mobilizing others rather than on preventing the out-
come. As it ultimately concerns a collective harm, the duty to join forces is irreducibly
collective. Furthermore, once enough people have been mobilized, they have a collec-
tive obligation to prevent the harm that is irreducibly collective also because it applies
to the collective as such.
Many harms can be prevented or mitigated only by the combined efforts of several
agents. Think, for instance, of someone who is trapped under heavy beams, of farm-
ers who overgraze a common area, or of ocean pollution. In such cases, the agents
lack control over the outcome. Even so, it often seems plausible to attribute an obli-
gation to prevent the harm to those involved. And this suggests that they bear a col-
lective responsibility in some sense of the term. Attributions of collective
responsibility can be conceived of in one of two ways, reductive or nonreductive.
According to the reductive conception, each agent has an obligation to contribute to
the preventive effort (Feinberg 1968; Miller 2001). The nonreductive conception
attributes an obligation to prevent the harm to the collective as such (Feinberg 1968;
Schwenkenbecher 2013; Bjo¨rnsson 2014; Wringe 2016). In this paper, I defend a
third hybrid conception of collective responsibility. In many cases in which individu-
als lack control, each individual agent has an obligation to mobilize others. And once
enough people have joined in, they ought to collectively prevent the harm. They
have what I call ‘a duty to join forces’.
Reducibility plays a central role not only in the literature on collective responsibil-
ity but also in that on social ontology. The question whether social groups can be re-
duced to individuals is complicated by the fact that groups can differ along a number
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of dimensions. Some groups are established from the inside by means of group iden-
tification; others are externally determined, for instance by their oppressors (Young
1990; Pierik 2004; Hindriks 2017). Some are organized, but many are not. And,
more controversially, some but not all are agents (French 1984; List and Pettit
2011). In this paper, I focus on what Virginia Held (1970) calls “random collectives.”
The members of such collectives have no significant ties to one another, at least no
ties that are relevant for the issue at hand. The only (relevant) connection between
them concerns some outcome: they can prevent a harm by combining their efforts.
Such collectives are as such obviously reducible to the individuals of which they con-
sist. One might think that this entails that they cannot bear irreducibly collective re-
sponsibilities. The argument of this paper reveals that this is mistaken.
After discussing the notions of moral responsibility and collective responsibility in
sections 1 and 2, I introduce the duty to join forces in section 3. This obligation con-
sists of two stages: mobilizing others and preventing the harm. Point of departure is
the claim that a random collective has a duty to prevent an outcome only if enough
of its members are ready to suitably combine their preventive efforts. Furthermore,
such a collective often acquires this duty only after a sufficient number of members
have been mobilized. Finally, its members have a duty to engage others in this collec-
tive endeavor. As the individual obligations are in the first instance directed not at
the outcome but at other individuals, the duty to join forces is what I call ‘a lateral
responsibility’.1
In sections 4 and 5, I argue that the first stage of the duty to join forces, the obli-
gation to mobilize others, is reducible in that it attaches to individual agents (but its
content is irreducibly collective). The second stage is irreducible in that, once
enough individuals have joined in, the collective as such has an obligation to do pre-
vent the harm. I argue, however, that its responsibility cannot come apart from those
of its members. Proponents of irreducible collective responsibility commonly defend
their view in terms of ‘the Irreducibility Thesis’ (Hindriks 2009): a collective can be
responsible for an action or outcome without any members bearing a correlative re-
sponsibility. Even though it involves irreducibly collective responsibility, the
Irreducibility Thesis does not apply to the duty to join forces.
1 . MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
You ought to save a child that is drowning in a pond, at least when the costs of doing
so are not too high (Singer 1972). As it concerns the future, an obligation such as
this one is a forward-looking moral responsibility. After the fact, you are answerable
for what you did or failed to do. You are then morally responsible in the backward-
looking sense. This means that you are a candidate for praise or blame. An agent can
be morally responsible for actions or outcomes.2 In this paper, I focus on outcomes.
More specifically, I focus on harmful outcomes, such as the death of the child. I do
not explore here whether and if so how my proposal generalizes to other moral con-
cerns such as justice.
Suppose that there is a pending harm. Obviously, it would be good if it were pre-
vented. It need not be, however, that anyone is responsible for doing so. In order for
this to be the case, there has to be a moral agent who is able to do it and foresees the
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pending harm or should foresee it. Furthermore, such an agent bears responsibility
only if she has no excuse or justification. As the italicized terms suggest, an agent has
to meet four conditions in order to be responsible for an outcome. As doing so will
turn out to be useful below, I briefly elaborate on each of them (without pretending
to discuss them exhaustively).3
The Agency Condition: The agent is a moral or normatively competent agent. She
is able to grasp normative considerations and bring them to bear on her decisions
and actions (Wallace 1994). In other roughly equivalent words, the agent is both re-
ceptive and reactive to moral reasons, or reason-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza
1999). Young children and psychopaths are commonly used examples of agents that
fail to be moral agents in this sense. Throughout the paper, I assume that the agents
that I am concerned with are indeed moral agents.
The Causal Condition: The agent is able to prevent the harmful outcome (Vranas
2007). For my purposes, this is the crucial feature of the Causal Condition. But it
does not exhaust it. As Harry Frankfurt (1969) observes, philosophers used to insist
that the agent could have done otherwise and prevent the outcome from materializ-
ing. One of many alternatives that have been defended is that it suffices if the agent
is able to refrain from contributing to it (Alvarez 2009). I will not try to settle here
which is the correct alternative. All I need to do here is to identify the ability to pre-
vent harm as a necessary condition for being causally responsible for it.
The Epistemic Condition: The agent consciously knows about the pending harm
(Held 1970; Levy 2014). It may well be that this widely accepted condition is too
strong. Perhaps justifiable belief suffices, or some form of nonoccurrent awareness
(Arpaly 2002; Smith 2006). It could also be that an agent is epistemically responsible
in virtue of the fact that she should know or justifiably believe that, if no one inter-
venes, the harmful outcome will materialize (Ginet 2000). However, if my argument
works for the strong formulation, it will generalize to the weaker ones. As I discuss
shortly, the Epistemic Condition extends beyond the harmful outcome to the likeli-
hood of success of preventing it.
The No-Defeaters Condition: The agent does not have an excuse or justification
(Wallace 1994). Suppose you are witnessing the child drowning in the pond. Under
normal conditions you will be obligated to save her. However, you do not have an
obligation to do so if you recently broke a leg. And it may well be that your obliga-
tion to save the child is overridden by another obligation if you can instead save the
lives of five children who are about to be crushed by a falling tree nearby. Or the
risks might be too high for you because there might be a crocodile waiting to attack
you on entering the water.
An important issue that I invoke below is that nobody has an obligation to do
something that is futile. Because of this, the likelihood of success is of crucial impor-
tance for establishing whether someone is under an obligation. Although this is pri-
marily an epistemic feature, it also involves the Causal Condition and the No-
Defeaters Condition. How high the likelihood of success is, depends on causal fac-
tors (Causal Condition). How high the likelihood of success should be, depends on
the costs to the agent relative to the moral stakes (No-Defeater Condition). For in-
stance, nobody can reasonably be expected to do something excessively dangerous.
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These considerations come together in what I call ‘the Prospect Clause’: The agent’s
effort to prevent the harm is sufficiently likely to succeed given the costs and the
stakes. An agent is responsible for a harmful outcome exactly if each of the four con-
ditions is met.
2. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The duty to join forces, which I present and defend in this paper, concerns what I
call ‘a collective harm’. This is a harm that can be prevented only by means of the
combined efforts of several individual agents. By definition, any particular individual
fails to meet the Causal Condition for such harms. This implies that, if there is a re-
sponsibility to prevent such a harm, it is the responsibility of some collective.
Another central feature of the duty to join forces is that is the obligation of a random
collective or an unorganized group. However, unorganized groups are not agents.
Hence, they fail to meet the Agency Condition. In section 4, I ask whether any of
the four conditions has to be reformulated in order to accommodate responsibility
for collective harms. First, however, I introduce different conceptions of collective
responsibility.
Various kinds of collective responsibility can be distinguished along two dimen-
sions. The first dimension concerns the kind of collective at issue. A collective can be
organized or unorganized. Organized groups are collections of individuals that decide
and act as a unit. According to a widely accepted view, the mark of collective agency
is making decisions by means of a collective decision procedure (Held 1970; French
1984; Tuomela 1995; List and Pettit 2011).4 Unorganized group collectives have not
adopted such a procedure. They can make ad hoc decisions to act together, but they
have not developed a sustained practice of doing so. However, their members can co-
ordinate their actions such that some collective outcome materializes. Because of
this, only organized groups are agents. Thus, unorganized groups are nonagential col-
lectives. The second dimension concerns the question whether the responsibility of a
collective can be understood in reductive or nonreductive terms. As a first approxi-
mation, a responsibility is irreducibly collective if it attaches to the collective as such.
If it does not, the collective responsibility can be explicated in reductive or individual
terms. Let me illustrate these distinctions by briefly discussing two of the four possi-
bilities: organized and nonreductive and unorganized and reductive.
Unorganized and reductive. Joel Feinberg (1968) considers a thousand people who
are lolling on a beach when at some point one of the swimmers is drowning. He
argues that each of the people on the beach has an obligation to save the drowning
swimmer until enough of them have taken action. This responsibility is collective in
that a thousand people have an obligation that has the same object. As each individ-
ual can fulfill it all by himself, the responsibility is also reductive.
Organized and nonreductive. Peter French (1984) considers the 1981 Paris plane
crash of a DC-10 and argues that McDonnell-Douglas bears responsibility for it. The
main deficiency that led to the crash were faulty inspection procedures that invited
inspectors to be “lax and careless” (French 1984, 141). No individual could reason-
ably be held accountable for them. French argues that it is implausible to regard the
inspectors as primarily responsible for the crash. However, due to the faulty
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inspection procedure the company as such is to blame. As none of the members is to
blame, at least not to any significant extent, the responsibility of McDonnell Douglas
is irreducibly collective.5
3. THE DUTY TO JOIN FORCES
The duty to join forces is the obligation of an unorganized group to prevent a collec-
tive harm. It consists of the obligation to mobilize others and make a coordinated ef-
fort to prevent the harm. As this description reveals, the duty to join forces consists
of two stages. During the first stage, individuals approach others to express their will-
ingness to contribute to preventing the harm. Furthermore, if need be, they encour-
age others to do the same. During the second stage, those who have in fact joined
the collective effort in this way act such that their combined efforts prevent the
harm.
In order to prevent a collective harm, several individuals have to act. How many
depends on the harm at issue. Because it requires contributions from a particular
number of individuals, or so I assume, the willingness that some individual expresses
during the first stage is in principle conditional on enough others joining in for a co-
ordinated effort to be successful. Now, when a group member approaches another
member, that other person ought to respond positively. This means that, if an indi-
vidual is approached by someone else, she is obliged to express her conditional will-
ingness to contribute in response. She thereby joins the collective endeavor. Once a
sufficient number of individuals have joined in, they incur the obligation to collec-
tively prevent the pending harm. As discussed below, this requires them to coordi-
nate their actions, if not cooperate. In contrast to the duty to incorporate (Held
1970; Collins 2013), the relevant individuals do not need to form a collective agent.6
As an illustration of the duty to join forces, consider a variant of Singer’s pond ex-
ample. In the original version, a child is drowning in a shallow pond, which is why I
call it “Shallow Pond.” Consider now an adult man who is drowning in a deep pond.
Two people are needed for saving him. I call this variant “Deep Pond.” Now, surely
it would be good if the man were prevented from drowning. The question is, how-
ever, whether there is an obligation to prevent him from drowning; and, if so, who
has it and what is its content.
When presenting Shallow Pond, Peter Singer imagines himself walking past the
pond. Suppose now that he is walking past the deep pond together with Peter
Unger. They see the drowning man. Presumably, they can reasonably be expected to
take action. The most distinctive feature of the example is the causal structure of the
situation. When considered on their own, neither of the two Peters is able to prevent
the outcome. But they would prevent it, were they to combine their efforts. So, even
though neither of them is able to prevent the pending harm, the two of them are.
Furthermore, I assume that they are both moral agents, that both are consciously
aware of all relevant factors, and that neither has an excuse or a justification that
could defeat any responsibility they might have. This means that the Agency,
Epistemic, and No-Defeaters Conditions are met. Under these conditions, it appears,
they have a collective obligation to save the drowning man.
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But how can they save him? It seems that one of them needs to take the initiative,
and the other should follow suit. Suppose Peter Singer takes the initiative. Peter
Unger is initially somewhat reluctant to take action and has to be pushed a little to
do so (perhaps because of his skepticism about moral responsibility). Singer convin-
ces him to contribute to the joint effort. Once the two have joined forces in this way,
they act together such that the man is saved. This description of what is needed to
save the drowning man settles what kind of obligation the relevant individuals have.
Initially, each has an obligation to express willingness to contribute and to get the
other to do so as well. Subsequently, they have the obligation to act accordingly and
save the drowning man by acting together. In other words, they have a duty to join
forces.
Importantly, the duty to join forces can also apply to situations in which individu-
als need not act together in order to achieve the desired outcome. Consider
Fishpond.7 In this example, two people, Alice and Bertha, live at opposite sides of a
large pond. Each of them regularly paints her boat. At some point, the fish in the
pond start to die. Alice and Bertha discover that this happens because the solvent
they use is toxic to the fish, something they had no reason to suspect earlier. In order
for the remaining ones to survive, both Alice and Bertha have to stop using the pol-
luting solvent. Now surely it would be good for the fish to live. But does this imply
that Alice and Bertha have a duty to stop using the polluting solvent? Not
necessarily.
Suppose each of them has reason to believe the other will continue using the sol-
vent even if she stops doing so. In that situation, it is pointless to stop using it unilat-
erally. This suggests that doing so is supererogatory at best. Things change, however,
if each acquires adequate reason to believe that he or she can rely on the other to
stop as well. When both Alice and Bertha have such a reason, each can reasonably
be expected to stop using the solvent. But how do they acquire this reason?
Presumably, they have to communicate with one another. Each has to express his or
her willingness to stop using the solvent. And perhaps one of them first has to con-
vince the other that this is the thing to do. In other words, they have to join forces
and make a coordinated effort to prevent the fish from dying. In light of this, I con-
clude that they have a duty to join forces.
An important intuition that supports this conception of collective responsibility is
that agents do not have obligations to do things that are futile. In Deep Pond, it
would almost be foolish for one person to try and save the person knowing full well
that he won’t succeed without help. In this case, preventing the harm is a joint action
that is constituted by two contributory actions. One might think, however, that in
Fishpond each individual should simply stop using the solvent irrespective of what
the other does. In this case the preventive effort consists of a composite action the
components of which can be performed independently. Even so, I submit that doing
so is supererogatory, as also in Fishpond a single contribution has no effect.
Individuals should have some reason to believe that the collective effort to which
they contribute will be successful. This depends in part on whether they can rely on
others to contribute as well. Hence, they need some reason to believe that enough
others will indeed contribute. Such a reason, I propose, is provided during the very
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process of joining forces, by individuals making each other mutually aware of their
willingness to contribute. As the Prospect Clause discussed in section 1 reveals, how
much warrant they need, or how likely success has to be in order for an agent to
have sufficient reason to act depends on the moral stakes on the one hand and the
costs the agent incurs on the other.
Now suppose that one or more individuals flout their duty to join forces due to
which such mutual awareness is not established. In such a situation, the members of
the collective do not have enough of a prospect to contribute to a successful preven-
tive effort. As a consequence, there is no collective obligation to prevent the harm.
This means that the first stage of the duty to join forces, mobilizing others, has to be
successfully completed in order for there to be an obligation to prevent the harm.
Because of this, the two-stage proposal just presented offers a dynamic conception of
collective responsibility. Another core feature of the proposal is that the first stage is
not directed at the outcome but at approaching other people and thereby making a
lateral move. This is why, in the introduction, I characterized the duty to join forces
as a lateral responsibility. I submit that the duty to join forces provides for a plausible
conception of responsibility in many cases in which individuals lack control.
4 . THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF THE DUTY TO JOIN FORCES
The duty to join forces applies to unorganized groups that are in a position to pre-
vent a collective harm. The question that remains is whether it is reducible to indi-
vidual obligations or whether it is irreducibly collective. Recall Feinberg’s drowning
swimmer example. Each of those who are lolling on the beach has an obligation to
save the drowning swimmer. As several individuals have this obligation, it is a collec-
tive responsible. However, given that each can fulfill it on his own, it is reducible to
individual responsibilities. The first stage of the duty to join forces differs from this
in at least two respects. First, each of those who have a duty to join forces has an ob-
ligation to mobilize others. This is a lateral obligation that is directed at other people
rather than at the outcome. Second, each individual has reason to mobilize others
only because one or more others have reason to do the same. This is because the ul-
timate goal is to prevent a collective harm. Because individuals have a duty to mobi-
lize, this obligation is reducible insofar as agency is concerned—just as in Feinberg’s
example. However, because it derives from the collective harm, its content is irreduc-
ibly collective, or so I propose (to mobilize others so as to ultimately prevent the
harm collectively). I defend this claim in further detail in section 4.1.8
At the second stage, the mobilized individuals have a duty to prevent the collec-
tive harm. The reductionist will want to say that at this stage each has an obligation
to make his or her contribution to the combined effort (Miller 2001, 239–40).
Although initially this might appear to be plausible for cases such as Fishpond, it is
implausible as a response to Deep Pond. In such cases, the individuals have to act to-
gether: they have to form and execute a joint intention. This suggests that the reason
they have is joint and therefore irreducibly collective.9 Strikingly, a similar consider-
ation applies to cases in which individuals can combine their efforts without acting
together. In Fishpond, the neighbors combine their efforts in a rather minimal
sense—simply by each stopping to use the solvent relying on the other to do so as
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well. Even so, it appears that the joint reason to stop using it is prior to the individual
reasons. It is of no use for a particular individual to stop. Instead, they have to stop
collectively. This suggests that the obligation that features in the second stage is irre-
ducibly collective.
In order to determine whether this interpretation is tenable, I consider two
theses—a reductionist one and a nonreductionist one. The reductionist thesis is a
stronger version of the Agency Condition, which I call “the Agency Thesis” (AT):10
(AT) Any moral responsibility is the responsibility of a moral agent.
Recall that the Agency Condition states that the only agents who bear responsibili-
ties are moral agents. This entails that human beings and nonhuman animals who
are not moral agents do not have moral responsibilities. It leaves open that collec-
tives can have responsibilities. In contrast, the Agency Thesis asserts that moral
agents are the only entities that do so. This thesis rules out that nonagential collec-
tives can as such have responsibilities. Tracy Isaacs supports this thesis when she
argues that “in situations in which collective agency is absent, moral responsibility, if
present at all, resides only at the level of individuals” (Isaacs 2011, 100).
The nonreductionist thesis is the Irreducibility Thesis that I mentioned in the
introduction (IT):11
(IT) A collective can be responsible for an outcome without any of its mem-
bers bearing a correlative responsibility.
In standard cases, the responsibility of a collective will distribute to its members
(even if it does not reduce to them). IT states that this is not necessarily the case.
Instead, there can be cases in which the collective is responsible without any of its
members bearing a correlative responsibility, such as the obligation to do their part.
Thus, it is possible for there to be a discontinuity between the responsibility of the
collective and its members. Such a discontinuity provides for a clear and vivid sense
of irreducibility.
In this section, I critically discuss AT and IT. In section 4.1, I argue that AT is
mistaken and conclude that unorganized collectives can have responsibilities. In sec-
tion 4.2, I argue that IT only applies to collective agents. I go on to argue that the re-
sponsibilities of nonagential collectives can be irreducibly collective in another sense.
In this way, I give further content to my proposal that individuals can have a duty to
join forces and, more specifically, that once enough of them have been mobilized,
they have a duty to prevent the harm collectively.
4.1 Against the Agency Thesis
According to the Agency Thesis (AT), any moral responsibility is the responsibility
of a moral agent. In contrast to the Agency Condition, AT rules out that nonagential
collectives can bear responsibilities. The Agency Condition can be made more spe-
cific such that the conflict with AT is more apparent: The only entities that can bear
moral responsibilities are moral agents and collections thereof. I refer to this as ‘the
Revised Agency Condition’. And I argue that it is to be preferred to AT.
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Both the Causal Condition and the Epistemic Condition can plausibly be general-
ized to accommodate collective harms. In section 1, I formulated the (core of the)
Causal Condition as follows: The agent is able to prevent the harm from occurring.
This fails to accommodate examples such as Deep Pond and Fishpond, as they con-
cern multiple agents. However, the condition can plausibly be complemented with a
clause for collective harms: The agents can prevent the collective harm from occur-
ring by suitably combining their efforts. Thus, the Revised Causal Condition reads as
follows: One agent is able to prevent the harm from occurring or several can do so
by suitably combining their efforts.
The Epistemic Condition is satisfied if the agent consciously knows about the
pending harm. This condition can be generalized to collections of individuals such
that each knows about it. It should also be required that they are mutually aware of
the pending harm (or perhaps that it is common knowledge). Recall that according
to the Prospect Clause the agent’s effort to prevent the harm is sufficiently likely to
succeed (given the costs to the agent and the moral stakes). As discussed above, in
the collective case this requires that the relevant individuals engender reasons to rely
on each other. They can do so by joining forces, a process that issues in mutual
awareness (or common knowledge). Thus, the Revised Epistemic Condition can be
formulated as follows: The agent(s) consciously know(s) about the pending harm
and, if there are several, they are mutually aware of it. Hence, just as the Causal
Condition, the Epistemic Condition can be generalized in a plausible way so as to ap-
ply to collective harms.12
The upshot is that, along with the Agency Condition, both the Causal and the
Epistemic Conditions can plausibly be reformulated so as to accommodate collec-
tives. The No-Defeaters Condition does not seem to raise special issues at this point
(I discuss it in section 4.2). This means that AT is mistaken. Hence, the second stage
of the duty to join forces can plausibly be interpreted in nonreductive terms: a collec-
tion of individuals that has joined forces with respect to a collective harm has an obli-
gation to prevent it. Such collective obligations are conceptually prior to the
obligations that its members have to contribute. Because they come first in this
sense, individuals can in principle derive their member responsibilities from the re-
sponsibilities of the collective. This means that, as I proposed in the introduction of
this section, the individual obligations do indeed have an irreducibly collective con-
tent. What is more, the responsibilities of the collective explain why members have
correlative responsibilities. Thus, their conceptual priority is matched by an explana-
tory priority. In this way, the fact that the harm at issue is collective supports the
claim that the obligation to prevent it is collective as well.13
4.2 Against the Irreducibility Thesis
The second thesis that I consider here is the Irreducibility Thesis (IT) according to
which there can be discontinuities between collective and individual responsibilities.
In order for IT to apply to nonagential collectives, it must be the case that the mem-
bers of a collective can have an excuse or justification that does not apply to the col-
lective as such. The relation between responsibilities and defeaters can usefully be
captured in terms of the distinction between pro toto and pro tanto obligation. In
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order for an agent to have an obligation, she has to have sufficient desire-
independent reasons to perform an action or bring about an outcome. If these rea-
sons prevail after all relevant factors have been taken into account, it is an all-things-
considered, all-out, or pro toto obligation. However, it is merely a pro tanto obligation
if it is defeated: because the agent has an excuse or a justification, she does not have
decisive reasons to act. As this distinction suggests, the No-Defeaters Condition
plays an important role in any argument in favor or against IT.
In order for IT to apply to unorganized groups, it must be possible for the follow-
ing two claims to be true at the same time. First, a nonagential collective has a pro
toto obligation to prevent a harm. Second, due to excuses or justifications, its mem-
bers do not have pro toto obligations to contribute to preventing the harm. If these
two claims are true, the relevant collective exhibits a responsibility gap. Now, in order
to understand why IT is surprising or at least informative, it is best understood
against the background of what David Copp (2007, 374) calls “the transfer
doctrine”: Collective pro toto obligations entail pro tanto member obligations. A re-
sponsibility gap is such that the collective has a pro toto obligation, while the pro
tanto member obligations are defeated. This in turn can be true only if the defeating
conditions at the member level need not scale up. More precisely: It must be possi-
ble for the member excuses and justifications not to defeat the responsibility of the
collective.
In particular this last observation is crucial for a proper evaluation of IT for the
kind of collectives at issue. Consider Deep Pond once again. Suppose that Singer
and Unger are rushing towards the pond. Unger steps in a rabbit hole in the ground,
falls, and breaks his leg. From that point onwards, he is excused and cannot reason-
ably be expected help save the drowning man. It appears, however, that the pair of
them is excused as well. Think of Unger as providing Singer with another pair of
arms and legs that he needs in order to prevent the pending death of the man. As
one of these legs is now broken, it seems Singer is excused, just as Unger is. Now, if
both are excused, there seems to be no sense in which the collective obligation sur-
vives Unger’s accident. It appears that the defeaters that apply to the member level
scale up to the level of the collective. Singer and Unger no longer have a joint obliga-
tion to save the man together, simply because they are not anymore in a position to
do so. It follows that there is no responsibility gap in Deep Pond.
Similar considerations apply to Fishpond. Suppose that Alice is willing to stop us-
ing the polluting solvent, while Bertha is not. This implies that Alice is excused.
Presumably, Bertha can be blamed for being unwilling to take appropriate action.
Now, what about the collective? Arguably, Bertha’s unwillingness also incapacitates
the collective as a whole. Given her dispositions, it is simply false that Alice and
Bertha can prevent the fish in the pond from dying. There is no relevant sense in
which the collective is able to do so. This suggests that the collective is excused, just
as Alice. In other words, the defeater that applies to the member level scales up to
the level of the collective. If this is correct, there is no discontinuity between the col-
lective and individual obligations in this case. Hence, Fishpond does not successfully
support IT.
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At this point, one might object that there is a relevant sense in which the collec-
tive is able to prevent the harm. If only Bertha were willing to do her part. I have ar-
gued, however, that the collective has an obligation only if the members can rely on
each other to contribute to a coordinated effort. And, in order for this to be the case,
Alice and Bertha have to join forces. Given Bertha’s dispositions, there is no way
Alice can convince her to stop using the solvent if he does. Because of this, there is no
collective obligation in the situation at hand. A fortiori, there is no discontinuity be-
tween collective and individual responsibilities. Instead, Alice and Bertha each have a
duty to join forces. To be sure, it remains true that it would be good if the fish were
saved. However, there is no corresponding collective responsibility to do so.
IT has considerable plausibility when it comes to collective agents (French 1984;
Copp 2007; Pettit 2007). When the collective is an agent, it is conceivable that the
excuses and justifications that apply to it differ from those of its members. Consider,
for instance, a member of a large company whose child falls seriously ill and requires
constant care. Arguably, this overrides many of his member obligations. However, a
large company can hardly, if at all, excuse a failure to fulfill its responsibilities by re-
ferring to considerations of this kind. After all, it could have taken precautionary
measures such that it would be suitably prepared for situations such as this one. This
suggests that in this case there is a discontinuity between collective and individual re-
sponsibilities. It is, however, far from obvious that a similar discontinuity can arise
between an unorganized group and its members.
A collective agent is constituted by its members (Uzquiano 2004; Hindriks 2012).
This supports the idea that it has causal powers of its own (Baker 2007). In contrast,
nonagential collectives are composed by their members. To the extent that it makes
sense to talk of composite causal powers, these are not located at a distinct ontologi-
cal level. Instead, they are simply the combined causal powers of the members of the
collective. Also, rather than to a distinct agent, any reasons they have apply to the
members in combination. This implies that insofar as unorganized groups are con-
cerned member excuses and justifications scale up. And if this is true, it cannot be
that no member bears a responsibility with respect to a harm while the collective as
such does. Those factors that defeat member obligations will also excuse or justify
the collective such that it is not responsible. In light of this, I propose to formulate
‘the Revised No-Defeaters Condition’ as follows: The agent or collective does not
have an excuse or justification. The thing to see, however, is that the excuses and jus-
tifications of nonagential collectives supervene on those of their members. Because
of this, IT does not apply to nonagential collectives. In other words, even though
such collectives can bear responsibilities, there can be no discontinuities between
their responsibilities and those of their members.
The upshot is that IT does not apply to nonagential collectives. Unorganized
groups cannot have excuses or justifications that are discontinuous with those of
their members. Both the falsity of AT and the limited applicability of IT have been
supported by generalizing the four conditions of moral responsibility in plausible
ways from agents to collectives thereof.
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5. PUTTING THE DUTY TO JOIN FORCES IN PERSPECTIVE
In order for it to have an irreducibly collective responsibility, an unorganized group
has to be in a position to prevent a collective harm. Others have defended more lib-
eral interpretations of this condition than the Revised Causal Condition just
defended. In this section, I briefly and critically discuss two arguments that have con-
clusions that reach farther than mine. One of them targets AT directly. The other is
a defense of IT for nonagential collectives (and thereby targets AT indirectly). I dis-
cuss them not to exhaustively evaluate them, but to put my own proposal into per-
spective and facilitate a comparison. Along the way, I illuminate some of its
attractions.
5.1 The Potentiality Argument
Some harms can be prevented only by a collective agent. However, in some such
cases, there will not be a collective agent that is able to prevent the harm at issue.
Even so, there might be an unorganized group that can transform itself into an orga-
nized group that does have the requisite ability. When this is the case, the reduction-
ist can claim that the members of the unorganized group have a duty to organize
themselves (Collins 2013). If they were to do so, the resulting collective agent would
have the responsibility to prevent the harm. It has been argued, however, that the
duty to prevent the harm can already be attributed to the collective prior to it be-
coming a collective agent simply because it has the potential to become one. This is
the core claim of what I call ‘the Potentiality Argument’. It has most recently been
defended by Bill Wringe (2010; 2014; 2016; see May 1992 for an earlier version). If
it is true, AT is false.
Wringe criticizes AT for requiring that the bearer be an actual agent. He argues
that the fact that an unorganized group is not yet an agent need not block the ascrip-
tion of responsibilities to it, as long as it can become one. In order for an unorga-
nized group to be a potential agent, it must be in a position to initiate a causal
process that prevents the relevant collective harm. As part of this process, it forms a
collective agent. Since it can do all this, the argument continues, the unorganized
group can as such have the responsibility to do so. Thus, a nonagential group can
bear responsibilities due to the fact that it can be transformed into a collective agent.
The commitments involved in the Potentiality Argument are rather strong. Just as
the duty to join forces, Wringe’s proposal requires attributing obligations to unorga-
nized collectives. This means that he has to reject the Agency Condition in favor of
the Revised Agency Condition (the only entities that can bear moral responsibilities
are moral agents and collections thereof). The duty to join forces supports the as-
cription of collective responsibility only to the extent that the members of the rele-
vant group are in a suitable position to discharge it. Wringe defends a significantly
stronger claim: “collectives which are not agents but which have the potential for
agency, can be the subjects of actual, and not merely potential obligations” (2016,
14). This might mean one of two things. First, unorganized groups can have respon-
sibilities if they are potential agents. Second, in addition to actual agents, potential
agents can have responsibilities. The second interpretation is suggested by his claim
that the collective agent owns the obligation. However, he also argues that the
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members of the unorganized collective are its addressees (2010). They are answer-
able for fulfilling the obligation (Wringe 2014, 175). Irrespective of which interpreta-
tion is correct, the Potentiality Argument entails that the agent that has the reasons
differs from the agents that respond to the reasons.14
A similar disparity arises with respect to the Causal Condition. Wringe’s proposal
requires generalizing the Causal Condition from agents to nonagential collectives. In
other words, he accepted the Revised Causal Condition (one agent is able to prevent
the harm from occurring or several can do so by suitably combining their efforts).
This revision is needed to capture the fact that the members can organize them-
selves. However, Wringe takes a further step by attributing the duty to prevent the
harm to the unorganized group. This creates an incongruence similar to the one just
discussed. The agent who is able to prevent the harm is the organized group that has
yet to be created. However, the responsibility for the preventive effort is attributed
to the unorganized group. Thus, the Potentiality Argument entails that the agent that
has the ability differs from the unorganized collective that is held causally responsible. A
similar argument can be developed for the Epistemic Condition. In all three cases,
the Potentiality Argument violates the plausible assumption that the entity that
meets the responsibility conditions is the entity that has the responsibility. Because
of this, I reject the Potentiality Argument and retain the Revised Agency
Condition.15
5.2 The Ability Argument
The second argument, which is meant to support IT, starts from the observation
that people might be unwilling to contribute to a collective effort to prevent a harm.
Suppose that this holds for all members of a collective each of whose contribution is
needed for successfully preventing the harm. And suppose that this is a matter of mu-
tual awareness. Under these conditions, unilateral contributions are futile. After all, a
single contribution has no effect on the collective harm. As a consequence, each of
them is excused. This in turn means that none of them is obligated to contribute. It
remains true, however, that the individuals would prevent the harm if they were to
combine their efforts or if they were motivated as they should be. Because of this,
the argument concludes, the nonagential collective is as such responsible for prevent-
ing the harm. The upshot is that the unorganized group has an obligation to prevent
the harm, even though none of its members has a correlative obligation. In this way,
the argument is meant to support IT, more specifically the version of this thesis that
is forward-looking and applies to nonagential collectives.
As this argument concerns what the collective is able to do, I refer to it as ‘the
Ability Argument’. It has most recently been defended by Gunnar Bjo¨rnsson (2011;
2014; see Feinberg [1968] for an earlier version). Bjo¨rnsson (2014) illustrates the
Ability Argument in terms of a variant of Fishpond.16 In addition to Alice and
Bertha, Claudia lives at the water and paints her boat regularly using the toxic sol-
vent. As it happens, none of the three distant neighbors is willing to do so. This
means that none of them are in a position to do so. Hence, none of them has an indi-
vidual obligation to contribute in this manner.
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At the same time, however, the unorganized group would succeed in preventing
the harm if its members were appropriately motivated. After all, in this situation they
are willing to contribute. Furthermore, they are ready to express their willingness to
each other. Bjo¨rnsson observes that this is what they should do: “A member of the
group has a pro tanto obligation to make others aware of her readiness to contribute
toward that end (perhaps by explicit offer, or by some modest first contribution)”
(Bjo¨rnsson 2014, 218; cf. Feinberg 1968). Because of this, they will in all likelihood
become mutually aware of each other’s motivational dispositions. This means that, in
morally ideal conditions, the three neighbors are in a position to do so. It follows
that both the causal and the moral responsibility of an unorganized group can come
apart or be discontinuous from those of its members. The upshot is that (AT is false
and that) IT can be true of unorganized collectives.
Bjo¨rnsson maintains that, even though the agency resides in the individual mem-
bers, the ability to act “pertains to the group as a whole” (Bjo¨rnsson 2014, 217). This
suggests that the Ability Argument suffers from the same problem as the Potentiality
Argument: the responsibility conditions are satisfied by different entities. In this case,
the individual members satisfy the Agency Condition, whereas the collective meets
the Causal Condition. On closer inspection, however, this is not the real problem.
There is nothing wrong with the claim as such when evaluated in terms of the
Revised Agency Condition and the Revised Causal Condition. The former allows for
collections of moral agents to bear responsibilities. And, according to the latter, it suf-
fices if several can prevent the harm by suitably combining their efforts.
The problem resides instead in the way in which the Revised Causal Condition is
evaluated. Suppose Alice changes her mind and becomes willing to contribute. This
is as such of little help given that a single person cannot prevent the harm all by her-
self. Now, consider the fact that Alice would be able to contribute to a successful pre-
ventive effort if Bertha and Claudia were to change their mind as well. Why would
this be relevant to the assessment of their responsibilities? Their unwillingness blocks
the ascription to the individuals. It seems that it thereby blocks the ascription with
respect to the collective.
As discussed in section 4.1, a successful argument against IT must show that the
member excuses and justifications not to defeat the responsibility of the collective.
Bjo¨rnsson will claim that he has done so by arguing that in morally ideal conditions
the collective is able to prevent the harm. However, his proposal does not provide
for a legitimate way of evaluating the abilities of a collective. The abilities of a collec-
tive agent have to be evaluated at the collective level (Hindriks 2008). However, this
does not hold for unorganized groups. As the relevant groups are not agents, they do
not as such have abilities (Lawford-Smith 2015a). In order for an unorganized group
to meet the Revised Causal Condition, the individuals have to be in a position to
prevent the harm by suitably combining their efforts. This, however, is not the case.
The upshot is that the Ability Argument provides no good reason to revise the con-
clusion that I drew in section 4.2: IT does not apply to nonagential collectives.












Some harms can be prevented only if several individuals act. I have argued that, in
such situations, individuals can have a duty to join forces. This duty consists of two
stages. First, individuals have to mobilize others. Second, they have to make a coordi-
nated effort to prevent the harm. Mobilizing others is a matter of getting others to
join the collective endeavor—of getting them to express their willingness to contrib-
ute to the coordinated effort conditional on enough others doing the same. The obli-
gation to mobilize others is an obligation of individuals. However, as it ultimately
concerns a collective harm, its content is irreducibly collective.
The duty to join forces is a lateral responsibility because individuals direct their at-
tention initially, not to the outcome, but to other individuals. The underlying idea is
that, only if enough people have joined the endeavor, each can rely on the others to
contribute such that their coordinated efforts are successful. When the mobilizing
efforts have generated a suitable prospect for success, a collective obligation to pre-
vent the harm comes into existence. This obligation is irreducibly collective because
it applies to the collective as such or to all of the relevant individuals in combination.
It pertains to the collective harm in its entirety and it is conceptually and explanato-
rily prior to the responsibilities of the collective. However, it exists only to the extent
that its members are in a suitable position to discharge it.17
NOTES
1. The duty to join forces applies to situations in which the agents need not form a new collective agent in
order to prevent the harm. See Held (1970), Collins (2013) and note 15 for cases in which this is re-
quired. Note that, just as a group of individuals, a collection of existing collective agents such as NGOs
or states can have a duty to join forces.
2. From this point onwards, I use the term ‘responsibility’ for moral responsibility unless otherwise
qualified.
3. I formulate the conditions in the present tense, for forward-looking responsibilities. Backward-looking re-
sponsibilities can be accommodated by reformulating them in the past tense.
4. Arguably, the members of collective agents have to collectively accept or even endorse the collective deci-
sion procedure (Tuomela 1995; Pettit 2017). Furthermore, they can, or perhaps have to, feature a divi-
sion of tasks and roles (French 1984; Tuomela 1995). Schmid (2014) argues that they have to have a
minimal form of first person of authority.
5. French (1984) argues that McDonnell-Douglas is a moral agent. See Copp (2006), Pettit (2007), and
Hindriks (2018) for other defenses of collective moral agency. For reductive interpretations of the re-
sponsibility of organized groups, see, for instance, Velasquez (1983).
6. Lawford-Smith (2015b) proposes a duty to signal or an obligation to express their conditional willing-
ness. This signaling duty differs from the duty to join forces in three ways. First, it also requires individu-
als to encourage others to do the same. Second, the relevant individuals have to coordinate their actions
or cooperate. The third difference is that Lawford-Smith regards the duty to signal as part of the duty to
incorporate or form a collective agent, as proposed by Collins (2013). The duty to join forces concerns
harms that can suitably be prevented without incorporation.
7. This example is inspired by Bjo¨rnsson’s (2014) Lake example. In section 5.2, I discuss how he uses it to
support the Irreducibility Thesis mentioned in the introduction.
8. Wringe (2016, 12–13) criticizes a proposal that is somewhat similar to the duty to join forces—a primi-
tive individual obligation to cooperate—for getting the phenomenology backwards. In relevant cases, he
suggests, the collective obligation appears to be prior to the individual obligations. As I see it, the pend-
ing harm warrants a collective moral concern in light of which individuals can conclude that they have a
duty to join forces. Furthermore, as just argued, the content of their individual obligations is irreducibly
collective. These two considerations, I submit, captures the phenomenology Wringe is concerned with.
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9. See Gilbert (1989) and Tuomela (2005) for accounts of joint intentions on which they are irreducibly
collective.
10. Wringe formulates a similar thesis to which he refers as ‘the Agency Principle’: “Only agents can be the
subjects of moral obligation” (Wringe 2010, 220).
11. I introduced this term in Hindriks (2009). French (1984), Copp (2006), and Pettit (2007) defend IT
for collective agents. See section 5 for defenses of IT in relation to nonagential collectives.
12. Sometimes the thing to do is simply to start contributing. This is a loud and clear expression of willing-
ness to do so. Furthermore, doing so might also encourage others to express their possibly conditional
willingness as well. Finally, it provides others with a reliable basis for coordination, and thereby serves to
satisfy the Prospect Clause.
13. See Tamminga and Hindriks for a logic of collective obligations that makes this more precise.
14. See Lawford-Smith (2012) for a critique of Wringe on this point.
15. As mentioned in section 3 and 5, individuals can also have a duty to incorporate (see also notes 1 and
6). Just as the duty to join forces, this is an individual obligation with an irreducibly collective content. It
provides for an attractive alternative to Wringe’s (2010; 2014; 2016) conception of collective responsibil-
ity for harms that can only be prevented by means of collective agents. See Collins (2013) for a reduc-
tionist version of this idea.
16. As mentioned in note 7, Bjo¨rnsson (2014) refers to ‘Fishpond’ as ‘Lake’. He uses the label ‘Known
Reluctance’ for the variant discussed in the main text. Note that he assumes that the fish would be saved
if two of them were to dispose of the solvent in a safe way.
17. I thank the audiences at the following events for useful comments: Aspects of Collectivity at the
University of Bristol (2014), the Ethics of Economic Institutions at the University of Utrecht (2015),
Collective Responsibility at the University of Helsinki (2017), and the OZSW Seminar on Moral
Responsibility at VU University Amsterdam (2017). I am also very grateful for valuable feedback from
and discussions with Olle Blomberg, Gunnar Bjo¨rnsson, Stephanie Collins, Niels de Haan, Holly
Lawford-Smith, Abe Roth, Kai Spierkermann, Allard Tamminga, and Bill Wringe.
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